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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 11-1935 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CRYSTAL BROWN,  
                          Appellant  
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-09-cr-00388-007 ) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 January 10, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 20, 2012) 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 
1. 
 Because we write solely for the parties who are familiar with the facts, we do not 
restate them herein.  In December of 2009, a grand jury sitting in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging the Appellant, Crystal Brown, with the 
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distribution of fifty grams or more of cocaine base, and conspiracy to distribute the same.  
Brown later pleaded guilty to a superseding criminal information that charged her with 
distribution of an unspecified amount of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
 A presentence report was prepared.  This report found Brown responsible for 
distributing 200 grams of cocaine base.  This put her base offense level for sentencing 
purposes at 30.  Following adjustments for her role in the offense and her acceptance of 
responsibility, her total offense level was 25.  After a thorough sentencing hearing, the 
District Court set Brown’s Guidelines range between 70 and 87 months.  Brown 
requested and received a variance from the District Court.  She was ultimately sentenced 
to 48 months’ incarceration. 
2. 
 On appeal, Brown challenges her sentencing, arguing that the District Court 
procedurally erred by attributing 200 grams of cocaine base to her for purposes of 
computing her sentence.  We review the District Court’s factual findings regarding the 
quantity of cocaine base at issue for clear error.  United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 
322 (3d Cir. 2001).  This determination need only be supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence, along with “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”  
United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 1999).  We will affirm. 
 We are satisfied that the District Court’s determination of the quantity of cocaine 
base distributed by Brown is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  We take 
note of Brown’s statements to the police upon her arrest.  She admitted to being at the 
residence of Brandon Beatty to pick up payment for a previous delivery of cocaine base.  
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Brown told the arresting officers that she had done this on several occasions.  Further, 
Beatty had told the police that he previously purchased cocaine base in 100-gram 
quantities and that Brown had collected the money for these deliveries.  This supports the 
District Court’s determination that, at a minimum, Brown was responsible for at least two 
shipments of 100 grams each. 
 Brown’s argument that she did not know the weight and/or quantity of the drugs 
being delivered is unavailing.  First, Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides 
that, unless otherwise specified, base offense levels, specific offense characteristics, and 
various adjustments shall be determined on the basis of “all acts and omissions 
committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused 
by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in 
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or 
responsibility for that offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).   See also United States v. 
West, 643 F.3d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 Second, we recognize that a district court’s calculations as to drug quantity cannot 
be based on speculation.  United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 998 (3d Cir. 1992).  
However, “a degree of estimation” is permitted the District Court in arriving at a specific 
quantity determination.  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 203 (citing United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 
1541, 1545 (3d Cir. 1993)).  A variety of evidentiary sources may be consulted by the 
District Court in estimating drug quantities.  These include the testimony of co-
defendants about the amount of drugs a defendant transported and the average amounts 
sold per day multiplied by the length of time sold.  Id.  Here, the District Court consulted 
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appropriate sources when it estimated the amount of cocaine base distributed.  Based on 
Brown’s own testimony as well as that of other witnesses, co-conspirators, and 
customers, the District Court was able to approximate the amount of cocaine base sold 
during her involvement in the conspiracy.   We conclude that the District Court used an 
accepted methodology for calculating drug quantity.  See id.  The District Court 
proceeded cautiously and arrived at a conservative estimate in concluding that Brown 
distributed 200 grams of cocaine base.  We can see no error in the District Court’s drug 
quantity findings. 
3. 
 In conclusion, the judgment of sentence given by the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
 
 
